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1. The concept of political exchange seems to be one of the 
first products "made in Italy" likely to meet with inter>-
(i)national success in the social sciences . And it is with • 
an eye to needs of the non Italian public that I will attempt 
to describe the concept referring to the authors who have 
contributed to the debate. It will be my concern to avoid an 
anthological or philological exposition. I will seek 
inspiration in the debate in order to present a personal 
reconstruction that will be useable by foreign researchers 
interested in the concept.
Obviously,the concept of exchange is not new neither in 
sociology nor in political science (Heath,1971). Homans (1961) 
limited himself to the exchanges between individuals and 
between groups,Blau (1964) expanded the concept so:as to.include 
of social life and organizational interactions. The Italian - 
authors,aware of these forerunners,developed the concept in 
relation with state interventions in industrial relations and 
neo-corporatist arrangements.
In the first section I show how a relational concept of 
power as an exchange of resources is antecedent to that of 
political exchange.In the second section I show how political 
exchange has its precise locus in the contemporary conceptuali­
zation of state-society relations. Section three provides the 
principal definitions of thevconcept which are given in the 
literature.Section four distinguishes political exchange from 
other types of social relations between large organizations.
Acknowledgement:
I wish to acknowledge my appreciation for the comments and 
suggestions of B.Marin,A.Mutti,P.C.Schmitter,C.Trigilia and 
all the participants the seminar "Theories of Political Exchange", 
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Florence during the 1984—85 academic year.As it is usual to say, 
none of them is responsible for the views expressed here;I am 





























































































In section five I attempt to investigate the kind of 
rationality with which actors negotiate in a political 
exchange. In section five I identify the structural and 
strategic conditions which permit the stabilization over 
time of political exchanges.
1. BEHIND POLITICAL EXCHANGE : TOWARD A RELATIONAL CONCEPT
OF POWER.
In Italy today the notion is widely accepted that political 
exchange,as I will specify in the pages ahead,is a negotiated 
exchange of power resources possessed by a social actor for 
power resources possessed by the state.
What notion of power is consistent with this kind of 
conceptualization ?
Power has been conceived in several and often dichotomous 
ways:either as a virtual potentiality or as the actual 
exercise of a capacity;either as a relation or as a substance; 
either as an action which relates two actors or as a general 
capability of a system (Goetschy,1981:447;Chazel,1983:369).
The only notion of power compatible with an-exchange theory 
seems to be that which considers power as a relation between 
actors. It is in fact not by chance that Blau^s definition of 
power is a relational one Weber's ^^^and Dahl's
definitions are relational. As well (Goetschy,1981:448).Less 
useful for an exchange theory is the systemic theory of power 
of Parsons (Goetschy,1981:454) and that of Hobbes,which sees 
power as something held by an actor (Stoppino,1982:12-3).
The most developed and consistent relational concept of 
power Is that of Crozier and Friedberg. Perceiving the relation 
in itself as generator of power,they criticize Weber's,Blau's 
and especially Dahl's definitions of power.According to 
Crozier and Friedberg,these authors still implicitly see power 




























































































and not as a'property of the relation in itself (Goetschy,
1981:448;Crozier and Friedberg,1980:276).Crozier and 
Friedberg's definition of power fits perfectly as a basis 
for the concept of political exchange stated above.In fact, 
they stress the substantial affinity between power and 
exchange .because power "can develop only through 
exchange among the actors involved in a given relation" and 
"is indissolubly linked to negotiation:It is a relation of v 
exchange,therefore of negotiation,in which at least two 
persons are involved" (1980-: 30-1).
Proceeding from this,one can understand power as a particular 
relation of exchange between individual or collective actors 
in which resources of the same or of a different kind are 
exchanged,with the ultimate aim of influencing the behavior ; 
others.
To be more precise.it is not so much resources possessed by 
the parties that are negotiated and exchanged,but the 
"possibilities for action" (Crozier and Friedberg,1980:32) 
connected with these resources. In the case,for example,of a 
relation of negotiation between the state and the unions, 
what interest both is that the other party adopt a specific 
behavior. The state may wish that the unions practice wage 
restraint,the unions that the state decide and implement 
pro-labor policies.
"Power,therefore,lies in the margin of liberty available 
to each partner in a relation of power.In other words,the 
more one partner is free to refuse what the other asks to him, 
the more power he bas" (Crozier and Friedberg,1980:32).
The bigger this "margin of liberty" is for an actor,the 
greater are the resources at his disposal and his capacity to 
mobilize them.
Thus formulated,one can gain a deeper understanding of the 
question,by asserting that power is an: a)instrumental, 




























































































a) It is an instrumental relation in the sense that:
"like every relation of negotiation .power is conceivable only 
from the standpoint of an aim which,....motivates the actors' 
commitment of their resources" (Crozier and Friedberg,1980:31).
b) It is a nontransitive relation in the sense that:
!'A might be able to obtain X from B quite easily,Y might be a 
little m o r e .difficult to get accomplished,and Z,impossible, 
while,on the other hand.C might be able to obtain Z from B 
without difficulty" (Crozier and Friedberg,1980:31).
c) Of great importance is the third aspect,that views the 
power:
"as a relation of exchange,hence a reciprocal relation,but 
one in which the terms of exchange favor one of the parties 
involved.lt is a relation of force from which one party can 
obtain more than the other,yet in which neither party is totally 
defenseless" (Crozier and Friedberg,1980:32).
The result of the exchange is consequently determined by
two factors.
1) The nature and the quantity of the resources at the 
disposal of each single actor.These are structurally determined 
by the economic and social position of the individual or the 
organization (Chazel,1983:392-3).
2) The rigid link "position in the social structure -
power resources - result of the power relation" is,however,
broken by the introduction of a?much more uncertain factor:
the capacity of the actor to exploit his resources.' It is not
enough,in fact,to have resources.it is also necessary,at the
moment of the negotiation,to act in such a way as to mobilize
: ( 5 )them effectivly,to make use of them in a pertinent way 
(Crozier and Friedberg,1980:36-7;Stoppino,1982:23).In other 
words.it is necessary to have a strategy of mobilization and' a 
strategy of exchange.
Having defined power and power resources in this way,let 
me now focus:on the latter to distinguish"between those power 
resources held by the state and those held by interest 
organizations.




























































































form of coercive .material and symbolic resources, further d i ­
vided into resources of a particularistic and non-partic- 
ularistic kind (Mutti,1983:169).Material resources are often 
the most convincing when it comes to making interest organiza­
tions accept a political exchange. Specific to the state is J 
that it can link to its resources,and to their utilization, 
the possession and the potential or actual use of coercive 
resources.That is to say,the state has the monopoly 
legitimate force (Stoppino,1982:202).The state enters thus in rela­
tion of exchange with interest organization holding " in the 
last instance constraining" resources,thanks to its legitimacy 
and its constitutional and legal prerogatives.
The resources of social power at the disposal of interest
organizations are material,organizational and ideological 
(7)(of identity) .The associations enter into negotiation 
with public powers with the possibility of mobilizing:their • 
resources of social power in support or against the state, 
that is by offering or withdrawing their consensus.
Some Italian authors consider the distinction between 
resources of political power and resources of social power, 
which is substantially of V/eberian inspiration, to be 
formalistic and unrealistic. Mutti in particular,stresses that 
the constraining capacity of the state is often only formal, 
because of the weight of power resources possessed by interest 
organizations.Consequently,for Mutti,resources can be defined 
as resources of political power whenever
"they are capable to influence,in a meaningful way,the social 
order,both by means of action and non-action.This capability 
to influence is based not only on the dimensional-quantitative 
aspect of the actors concerned,but also on their qualitative 
aspect, that is their strategic importance* in the structure of 
the social interdipendencies." (Mutti,1985:54)
According to this definition,resources of political power 
can be held not only by the state but also by large interest 





























































































Consequently,as we will see in sect, three,political exchange 
is conceptualized by some as exchange between resources of 
political power and resources of social power;by others as 
exchange between resources of direct political power held by 
the state and resources of indirect political power (meant as 
the basis of the negative capacity of interest organizations 
to block or disturb state policies);and by others as exchange 
between resources of political power possessed by the state 
and resources of political power held by interest organizations.
At this point it is clear that I have assimilated the 
relations of exchange between resources of political power and 
resources of social power to a moment within the "political 
process". It is therefore appropriate to recall first 
Schumpeter and secondly Pizzorno.
Schumpeter (1976) initially views democracy as a process of 
competition between political elites♦Neglecting some problems 
of which Schumpeter was more aware (Pizzorno,1983:6-7),his 
successors elaborated the so-called "economic theories of 
democracy",where democracy
"is seen as a system analogous to the market of free competition, 
in which the voters are the buyers who,with their vote,acquire 
the policies they prefer among those which are proposed to 
them by political entrepreneurs who,with the sale of their 
policies,acquire,or mantain,power {that is,they occupy 
government offices)" (Pizzorno:1983:7).
In this perspective,consensus is still perceived as individual 
consensus,expressable through the vote.Thus,this approach dis­
regards the existence of different and less formalized 
forms of exchange,such as those between the state and large
organizations.
It was Pizzorno (1978) who finally emancipated the theory 
of exchange in politics from these individualistic assumtions. 
With the intention of developing "a theory of ...'political 
aspects' of the labour market" (1978:278),-Pizzorno ;begins 




























































































unions) are exchanged in the context of political democracy 
and capitalist economy.
The bargaining action of the unions with the employers
involves,according to Pizzorno.a series of "external 
(8)economies" »capable of damaging the socio-political order. 
The state being ultimately responsible for the latter, 
becomes involved in the problem. At this point the unions can 
accept'to underexploit their own "short-term market power"
(1978:282),in order not to damage socio-political order,if 
the state is disposed,in exchange for this restraint,to 
offer the workers medium or--long-term benefits. In this way, 
resources of social power are exchanged for resources of 
political power. Summing up:
"While in the atomistic market more gains were obtained in 
exchange for more effort,and in the collective bargaining in 
exchange for continuity of work,in the political market the 
resource'given in exchange may be called consensus or support. 
An actor (generally the government) which has goods to give is 
ready to trade them in exchange for social consensus with' an 
actor who can threaten to withdraw that consensus ( or,which 
is more .;or less the same) to endanger order ) unless he 
receives the goods he needs" (Pizzorno:1978:279).
2. POLITICAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN SOCIALIZATION OF POLITICS AND
POLITICIZATION OF SOCIETY.
The development of capitalism in the present age has led 
to an ever increasing involvement of the state in the economic 
and social sphere. On the other hand,it is also evident that 
this process has rendered the efficacy and the effectiveness 
(Mura:1983:130) of state action more and more dependent on the 
consensus of social forces. At this level,as Maraffi (1981:30) 
rightly observes,the fracture occurs between the classical 
liberal state and the post-liberal state.In fact,the latter,as 
noted sharply by Lowi (1969:101-24).brings private interests 
into the governmental process.





























































































brought with it a revaluation of the idea of the contract 
in order to understand processes of government. In this 
regard the repercussions of the phenomenon at the level of 
political philosophy are important for my argument.
In one of his most recent essays,Bobbio (1984) considers 
the concepts of contract and political exchange. Modern 
political science and sociology,and ever more the every day 
observation of political life,have raised severe doubts 
about the understanding of government processes as state 
authoritative acts materialized in laws. In fact, the classi­
cal theory of modern state sees the "law as the principal 
form of the normativeness of living together" (Bobbio,1984:
227). But,as Bobbio also observes,the proliferation of cate­
gories as "political market","political exchange" and "vote 
of exchange" (as opposed to "vote of opinion") makes the 
understanding of contemporary government on the basis of 
"public law logic of dominion" impossible,and makes necessary 
that this logic be integrated with the "private law logic of 
agreement" (1984:132). The state,certainly,holds the virtual 
monopoly of legitimate force.it legitimately possesses coercive 
resources on the basis of the Constitution,but,as Bobbio 
observes : "what worth has legitimacy without effectiveness ?" 
(1984:146). State power remains often merely formal,given that 
public action can be efficacious and effective only if the 
measure is negotiated with the main interest organizations.
The political exchange that then occurs between the state and 
the associations resembles more an agreement reached within a 
relation between equals,typical of private law,than one reached 
within a relation between governor and governed,typical of 
public law.
Thus,it happens that politics is socialized and the social 





























































































This tendency is shared both by pluralist and neo-corporatist 
relations. Both these arrangements share in fact,as Schmitter 
(1979:15) says, the "interpenetration of private and public 
decision arenas".
The risk of proliferation of relations of exchange between 
state and interest organizations weakens,however,state author­
ity: "the 'sovereign power',in the traditional sense of the 
word,whose place would be super partes ,figures as a potentate 
among the others,and not always as the stronger" (Bobbio,1984 : 
136).
The segmentation and privatization of law-making,often 
connected with these close relations between state and asso­
ciations , leads Schmitter (1984:38) to talk about the emergence 
of a "post-liberal Ständestaat" with "considerably more 
categories of differentiated privilege and obligations" with 
respect to the legally universalistic liberal state.
This opinion is expressed,with even greater force,by 
Pizzorno,when he introduces the concept of the "decomposition 
of the state" (1981:262).
"The practice of negotiating every decision tends to decompose 
the core of the political system,the state as the ultimate 
public authority and unitary coherent subject" (1981:262).
From being an "entity" which has to receive and sift demands 
put forward by interest representatives,the state becomes a 
"market" ,a "battlefield" where organized interests negotiate 
and exchange their resources of social power,between themselves 
and with the state,where this can be both a partner and an
intermediary for thè interest-organizations.
\
Behind thèse processes of political exchange there is,to­
gether with the risk of the "decomposition of the state",the 
risk of the so-called "governability crisis" (Donolo and 
Fichera,1981).
Before looking at the subject in greater detail in the 
following section,let me respond to the question a non—Italian
reader may ask. What purpose does it serve to introduce into 
the inflated body of the social science terms a new concept 




























































































My "justification" derives precisely from what I said in 
this section : let me consider,in fact, the possible modes of 
state-society relations.
The first mode of linking the institutional domain to the 
socio-economic one is the "classical" one of the party-parlia­
mentary political circuit (Offe,1981:141),that is through 
political parties,parliament,elections,votes etc.In this way, 
through the mediation of political parties,organizations and 
individuals channel their demands and supports to the state.
This kind of relation has long been investigated in political 
science and in the study of the constitutional law.
Besides this first modality there is that of direct,
unmediated relations between government and/or administration,
on the one side, and interest organizations,on the other side,
(9)(at the decisional and often at the executive level) .These 
direct relations have materialized,depending on the contexts, 
in pluralistic arrangements of pressure,or in neo-corporatist 
arrangements of concertation,both sectoral and trans-sectoral, 
giving birth in this case to a veritable neo-corporatist 
political circuit (Offe,1981:141).
Both in pluralistic and neo-corporatist arrangements the 
state and interest organizations engage in an exchange of 
policy measures for consensus. In the second case these exchange 
relations are more visible and formalized,in the firbt much 
less so.
Consequently,a first reason justifying the analytical and
empirical use of a concept like "political exchange" is just✓ ’that it individuates the dimension of the exchange as an 
increasingly crucial aspect in contemporary state - society 
relations and in connected public policies.In this respect 
Bagnasco (1985:11) observes :
"Political exchange is used in a general meaning in order to 
underline the bargained character that political intervention 
assumes in modern democratic societies. This happens indepen­
dently of the specific form of thè exchange,that is indepen­
dently of the fact that in concrete situations one can observe... 
whether a fragmented bargaining among several competing 
interests ('pluralism') or a more aggregated and centralized 
bargaining among big organized interests organizations ('neo­




























































































A second reason is connected with the conceptual enrichment 
that an approach based on political exchange brings into the 
debate on the features of state — society relations which started 
in 1974 with Snhmitter's "Still the Century of Corporatism".
While the concepts " pluralism - neo-corporatism" look 
at the structure of the system of interest intermediation, 
and while the concepts of "pressure'- concertation" look at ■ 
the structure of the system of decision-making (Schmitter,
1982 : 263 ),the concept of "political exchange",emphasizing
the action more than the structure,looks at the process and 
relational aspects of the state-society interactions.
The concept of political exchange permits us to enlighten the 
aspect of the strategic calculations which public and private 
actors carry out and develop within their direct interactions, 
be these pluralist or neo-corporatist.In this respect,both 
Schmitter and Lehmbruch have recognized the heuristic value 
of the concept (see note 1 ).
Drawing a'first cbnclusion,one can say that in-the "grey- 
zone.". between -the political and the social sphere,Italian 
researchers formulated the concept of "political exchange", 
and developed it within the interdisciplinary field of 
"political sociology"
3. POLITICAL EXCHANGE IN THE ITALIAN LITERATURE : SOME
DEFINITIONS.
At this point it should be easier to understand the defi­
nitions of political exchange presented in the Italian lit­
erature .
In this short review the reader will realize how political 
exchange,as exchange relation between resources of power held 
by the state and resources of power held by interest organiza­
tions, is interpreted differently according to the diverse 
research intentions of the authors.
Stoppino,close to the conceptualizations of "classical" 





























































































"One can and must define the normal political process as a 
political exchange » insofar as the support given or promised 
is guided by the search for previously obtained,promised or 
hoped contents of political decisions » and insofar as the 
political decisions and programs are guided by the search for 
present,probable or possible political support."
Rusconi,among other aspects,stresses how the concept 
accounts for the fact that politics is getting closer to eco­
nomics and viceversa.
"I start therefore with a plain definition of political exchange. 
This is definable as a situation in which goods of diverse 
nature are exchanged between economics and politics.The pro­
tagonists of the transaction are the organized groups and the 
state,in various combinations. The goods of diverse nature 
that are exchanged can be wages,employment,investments,credit 
or taxation facilities etc.,as well- as political loyalty, 
democratic consensus or simply the suspension of active dissent, 
or the postponement of sanctions." (1984:19).
Regini , closer to Pizzorno's original intentions , aims at
investigating the kind of relations which occur between state
and unions.Referring to the type of exchange in which a rela-
( 11 )tion of concertation • > ■ occurs,he defines political exchange as
-"a kind of relation between state and workers ' organizations 
based on a reciprocal attribution of different forms of polit­
ical power.The state delegates a part of its decisional author­
ity in matters of economic policy to unions,enabling them to 
contribute to the determination of the results of the processes 
of formation and implementation of political choices and, 
consequently,to benefit from the distribution of material and 
symbolic public resources. In exchange for this,the unions 
offer the state their indirect political power,guaranteeing 
consensus and using their own resources to secure legitimation, 
efficiency and efficacy for state action." (1983:360).
Baglioni»proposing a broader typology of relations between
the formation of public policies and the system of industrial
relations,defines political exchange as a situation in which
"the representation of the interests of the unions turns out 
involved with and mediated by political factors and conveniences 
at stake.” (1983:841).
He then distinguishes between "pluralistic political ex­
change?’ and "neo-corporatist political exchange". The former
"denotes a relative separation between the assertion and the 
settlement of interests expressed by unions' action in the 
direct sphere of industrial relations,on the one side»and its 
undoubted political implications,on the other" ;
While in the latter ;fhe. relative separation between the




























































































effects on the political arena tends to disappear.There 
then occurs a comprehensive politicization also of the inters 
ests expressed in the industrial arena (1983:842).
In my study of neo-corporatist arrangements in Switzerland,
my objective was to reconstruct the relations between state and
interest organizations and the related problem of governability
and policy-making. Thus,I defined political exchange as
"a relation between state and interest organizations which 
takes place in the course of the formation and implementation 
of public policies,and within which a reciprocal exchange of 
power resources occurs. Those at the disposal of J -the state 
include coercive,material and symbolic resources (resources 
of direct political power). The interest organizations 
determine social consensus and,by giving or withdrawing it, 
they can mobilize in support or against the state - their 
own specific power resources,which are of an economic,organic 
zational and ideological kind (resources of indirect political 
power). Therefore,a political exchange occurs when the state 
allows the interest organizations to influence the content 
of public decisional and executive processess,so they can 
profit from part of its material,coercive and symbolic re­
sources; and when,in exchange for this,the interest organizations 
give their consensus to the state. This means that they 
use their economic,organizational and ideological resources 
in order to guarantee the efficacy and the effectiveness of 
state policies.
Consequently,there are neo-corporatist arrangements when 
there are institutionalized relationsi in a more or less formal 
way,within which state and interest organizations stably 
co-operate in making and implementing decisions. In other words, 
when there is concertation . Moreover,within concertatibn■ 
there are stable political exchanges,because the reciprocal 
exchange of power resources between state and interest organi­
zations is characterized by temporal and substantive continuity.
In this way interest organizations come to exert a stable 
influence over public decision-making and implementation, 
thereby gaining substantial political status. This political 
status makes government of society part state government,part 
self-government of intermediate bodies.
Pluralist arrangements are marked differently. They involve 
classical "pressure" activity,characterized by unstable polit­
ical exchanges,in which the exchanges of power resources 
between public and private actors are temporally and 
substantially discontinuous,limited to single issues,about 
which an association is able to influence state decisions, 




























































































have no political status: they are considered as external 
partners,with chiefly an economic field of action." (Parri, 
1984:98-9).
Finally,! have left the definition which among those 
current is the most articulated,and which follows two 
previous conceptualizations (Mutti,1982:296-8;1983:167-70).
According to Mutti,the distinctive element of political 
exchange,as compared to other forms of social negotiation,is 
the particular kind of the exchanged object,that is,the fact 
that what is exchanged are resources of political power.
Consequently,for Mutti political exchange is
"a relation occurring between state and interest groups, 
meant as a transaction in which the former enables the latter 
to intervene in the contents and the implementation of state 
policies,in exchange for political support (ranging from 
electoral support to the defence of political order,to the 
acceptance of systemic compatibilities etc.). This transaction 
has as its object,therefore,political power in the form of, 
on the one hand,determination and implementation of state 
decisions,and,on the other hand,the giving of consensus.
This transaction can be the result of pressures exercized on 
the state by interest groups,or of more stable forms of 
concertation between such actors." (1983:54).
The distinction between pluralist and neo-corporatist 
political exchange,touched upon in the last sentence,is further 
elaborated by Mutti referring to the famous typology of Lowi 
(1964:713) which distinguishes distributive,regulative and 
redistributive public policies.
"Weak political exchange manifests itself in the frame of 
distributive policies,that is of policies which can be widely 
disaggregated,are easily quantifiable and can be directed to 
individual actors. One has here an extension of the concept 
of political exchange,such as to include also individual polit­
ical actors. Tiie strong decomposition of interests and the 
particularization of conflict make ,moreover,less problematic 
the problem of consensus." (1983:54) ;
'^strong political exchange operates, instead, in the domain of 
regulative and redistributive policies»which are more general 
and can be-less easily disaggregated.In the arena of strong 
political exchange essentially collective political actors are 
engaged. The negotiated resolution of conflict,which these •' 
actors carry on,appears particularly crucial for the general 
reproduction of the political system. Moreover,in strong polit- 




























































































degree of uncertainty,because of the complex character of the 
involved issues.All these factors stimulate the activation of 
particular strategic endowments in organized social groups which 
partecipate in strong political exchange..." (1985:54).
Summing up,one can propose the following table.
Table 1 . Political Exchange ( PE ) in the Italian Literature
Type of State - Society Relation
Vote Clientelistic Pluralist Neo-Corporatist
Relation* Relation* Relation Relation
(State + (State + (State + (State +
Individ- Individual Interest Interest
ual ) or Group) Group) Organization)
Author
Stoppino PE PE PE PE
















































































































4 . POLITICAL EXCHANGE,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND "QUASI 
POLITIK"
What are the differences between political exchange,on the
C13)one hand,and collective bargaining and "Quasi Polltik" ,on 
the other ?
In political exchange resources of political power (held 
by the state) are exchanged for resources of social power 
(held by interest organizations). In collective bargaining 
and in self-regulation what is negotiated and exchanged are 
exclusively resources of social power (held by interest orga­
nizations ),without resources linked to the virtual monopoly „ 
of force (state coercive resources) entering the exchange .
In both cases an agreement is realized,but only in the 
first case is the state explicitly present. The state can 
certainly intervene,in some cases,both in collective bargaining 
and self-regulation,to render the agreement between parties 
legally binding,or to facilitate it by promising payoffs.
In these instances the introduction of coercive resources and 
especially of public material resources shifts the negotiation 
and the agreement from the domain of socio-economic self-regu­
lation to that of political exchange.
Obviously those who,like Mutti (1985),think that unions and 
employers can also be holders of resources of political power can 
consider collective bargaining and self-regulation (whenever 
they are particularly crucial for the reproduction of the so­
ciety) as a form of political exchange.
Pizzorno also concerned himself with distinguishing political 
exchange And collective bargaining,stating that in these 
relations two different kinds of resources are involved (1978: 
287). Moreover,he writes explicitly that
"...a situation of political exchange differs from one of col­
lective bargaining because : a) benefits are obtained against 
a threat to social order or social consensus1,while in collective 




























































































of work ; b) market power is function of the need for consensus 
,not of the demand of labour ; c) several actors may concur 
with the unions in 'mediating consensus' (political parties 
being of course the main example) (1978:280).
5 . THE "RATIONALITY" OF ACTORS IN POLITICAL EXCHANGE
In the first section we have seen that the moment an orga­
nization renounces short-term benefits to aim for long-term 
ones.it has to elaborate a different kind of strategic cal­
culation. In a more specific perspective,leaving out the 
highly problematic aspect of the state strategy,each collective 
actor,at the moment it negotiates with public power in order- 
to reach an agreement through a political exchange,will find 
it necessary to develop a certain decisional "rationality".
That is to say,a set of mechanisms and procedures to orient 
its action,to direct its negotiating behavior,to evaluate the 
proposals of the other party,to judge the development of the 
bargaining and of its intermediate and final results.
One must not forget,and at this point I open a parenthesis, 
that strategic action presupposes the formation of a collective 
identity,a fact long neglected by the dominant theories of 
collective action (normally of economic inspiration).
As a matter of fact,Pizzorno says,criticizing the internal 
consistency of the neo-utilitarian theories of rational choice, 
that
"one can not have a concept of utility without impliying the 
intersubjective recognition of the values which lead to this 
utility. And,therefore,the processes of satisfaction of needs 
vary according to the different collective identities which 
substain them (and which recognize them)."(1983:38).
This is valid both for the "rational" calculation of indi­
viduals and for that of organizations .which is even more complex. 
Organizations,in fact,also require a system of reference in 
which decisions and evaluations assume a meaning. This system 




























































































confrontation of this identity with other organizations'1
collective identities. The interests of the actors,their
way of conceiving the interests of the organization of which
they are members or leaders,are not to be exclusively based
on their utilities in the way classical theories of "rational
( is )action" imagine . The interests,the value of goods -individ­
ual or collective- sought after or possessed are perceivable 
and understandable only if these are also intersubjectively 
recognized and recognizable. That is to say,if they are placed 
within a system of shared values : the collective identity of 
the organization both in itself,and as distinct from other 
collective identities of other organizations.
Moreover, the temporal "viscosity" of the collective identity 
is a guarantee that the parameters of actors' -judgements are 
not submitted to sudden jolts which would make a medium or 
long-term calculation problematic (Pizzorno,1983 : 38-9).
It has also been noted that collective identity becomes more 
important,the more the organization has to redefine the 
interests of its own members,shifting from individualistic-util­
itarian ones to collective-solidaristic (Pizzorno,1980a,1980b ; 
Offe and Wiesenthal,1980). This fact is mainly characteristic 
of workers' organizations,especially "class unions".which 
Scarry always out a deep modification of the specific demands 
of their onw basis" (Regini ,..1981 :195).
Entering a relation of political exchange with the state 
workers' or employers' organizations always make evaluation of 
a strategic kind which,as we have seen*imply the possession of 
a collective identity. Therefore,in every relation of political 
exchange collective identities also enter the field and confront 
each other. Consequently,according to the different results 
of the negotiation and of the political exchange,collective 
identities can be denied,confirmed or simply changed (Rusconi, 
1984:73).




























































































economic or organizational power resources,as a "game" 
between different strategies,but also as a confrontation of 
diverse collective identities. This last fact in particular 
makes the evaluation of the results of the exchange very- 
problematic. Up to now,notwithstanding the suggestions of 
Pizzorno and Rusconi,the Italian literature has not been able 
to provide a clear image of the complex dynamic "collective 
identity - strategic action - political exchange".
Thus,closing this parenthesis,let me concentrate on the 
three principal answers given to the question of the actors' 
"rationality" in political exchange : those of Mutti,Rusconi 
and Regini.
Mutti poses the problem in terms of the actor's search for 
the strategy best able to control the "uncertainty of the 
bargaining context" (1985:58). In that regard he refers,crit­
ically, to the typology of the three models of decisional 
"rationality" of March and Olsen (1976).
The first model of the typology is the classical "synoptic
(l6 )model based on an utilitarian rationality of parametric kind"* 
(1985:58). This parametric "rationality" approaches the "ratio­
nality" of individual actors in the clientelistic,weak political 
exchange (as defined by Mutti,see sect, three),where uncertainty 
and stability levels are low (1983:169).
The second model of the typology is that of "bargaining"
• (17)which implies a strategic kind of "rationality" . Mutti 
considers that this strategic model,even though it renders the 
assumptions about the behavior of actors more realistic than 
the parametric one,is still unable to account for problems of >■ 
negotiation in a very uncertain context such as that of strong 
political exchange,both of a pluralist and a neo-corporatist 
nature.
He suggests,therefore, utilizing the third model of March
(18)and Olsen : the "garbage can" model . This would have the




























































































structural context,overcoming the actor - system dichotomy 
typical of méthodologie individualism,and still present -in 
his view- in the more sophisticated versions of the strategic 
"rationality" model. In this last model,in fact,the actor J- 
would still be "too informed and competent" (1985:60)»while in 
the "garbage can" model his indipendence is reduced,until 
almost dissolved -especially in situations of great uncertainty- 
into adaptive responses.myopic or routine..Actor's behaviors 
are also the fruit of processes wàich,escaping his control, 
show the imprint of the surrounding structural-institutional 
framework.(1985:74).
Rusconi seems definitly more optimistic about the capacity 
of actors in political.exchange. First,he reviews the concept 
of strategic action in the works of Schelling,Habermas,Crozier 
and Friedberg,Boudon,and second the contributions to game theory 
of Harsany,Rapoport,Riker and others. At the end he proposes 
to use a theory of "rational choice",integrated by a theory of 
the identity,as an heuristic device for the interpretation of 
negotiations connected with political exchange.- Also important 
is the reference he makes to Elster's (1982) use of game theory 
in the interpretation of class relations as a conflict-cooper­
ation mix.
According to Rusconi,if one thinks
"of the forms of conflict in contemporary society,...,then the 
dynamic of conflict can effectivly be formalized in the 
'prisoner's dilemma',at least insofar as the two principal ac­
tors .unions and employers,are involved." (1984:219).
Also if
"more complex situations,of the kind of 'political exchange' 
require indeed a different model" (1984:219).
As in the "prisoner's dilemma",in the class dynamic there 
is always the risk that the non-collaborative solution,socially 
more damaging,prevails. This because uncertainty and distrust 




























































































The iteration of the game-bargaining can,it is true, 
guarantee an agreement (the so-called "anti-statist" solution 
of the class conflict.1984:202-3),but when this does not 
occur and social costs seem to high,then the prospect of a 
"statist-institutionalist" solution becomes larger (1984:
203-4).
In fact,
"to escape from the dilemma and secure a positive result,of a 
collaborative type,the action of another actor,which possesses 
different resources,is needed. In the concrete case of industrial 
conflict in contemporary democracy the intervention of the state 
in the form of'political exchange' is necessary.But,with this 
intervention,the structure of the game changes."(1984:221) .
There are two possible solutions of the dilemma via state 
intervention.
The first is the canonic institutionalist one,well-known in 
the classical literature about the dilemma.In this case the 
coordination of actors' actions is obtained through state 
authoritative enforcement,where this
"enforcement prefers coercion with respect to other forms of 
coordination between actors. ’That is,the actors agree to secure 
themselves of loyal reciprocal behavior thanks to the presence 
of an authority capable of putting into practice by coercion 
what they decide." (1984:74).
The second solution of the "prisoner's dilemma" occurs via 
political exchange. In this case,according to ®usconi,the state 
intervenes
"directly distributing resources to the advantage of the parties, 
in order that they arrive at an agreement.In this situation 
the parties are disposed to harmonize their decisions and their 
behaviors,not so much because the state supervises authorita­
tively,but because it is disposed to contribute its share to 
the agreement" (19) (1984:74).
However,in the hurry to free himself from the functionalist 
burden which weighs on the traditional explanation of the 
class dynamic,Rusconi overvalues the capacities of the game 
theory.
Let me,in fact,recall the fundamental criticism of Elster 




























































































" 'social structures' remain irreducible to individual acts 
of decision".
Rusconi's answer is resolute:
"It seems a fundamental objection,but in reality it introduces 
the obsolete dichotomy between 'structure' and 'action'.The 
game theory overcomes in part this dichotomy ,from the moment 
that it sees 'structures' as a constraint- (or as a stimulus) 
for the actor's action." (1984:216).
In this way Rusconi goes beyond Elster's prudence about 
the question of the "dualism of 'choice versus structure' " 
(Elster,1983:115),and explicitly criticizes him for his prudence 
(Rusconi,1984:217).Thus, Rusconi's position provokes the 
critical response of Pizzorno (1984:168) and especially of
fMutti who writes:
"...in reality,the most relevant limit of methodological indi­
vidualism in general,and of the game theory in particular, 
continues to be the necessity of presenting strategic actors 
able to understand and internalize adequately,in the forms of 
constraints,not only the characteristics of the interactive 
negotiation context,...,but also the macrostructures.In order to 
«keep inside' the structures in its explicatory core,game theory 
is compelled to imply unreal actors,unreal because they are 
too informed (1985: 74).
While Mutti and Rusconi articulate their thought about the
"rationality" of the actors in political exchange at a high
level of abstraction,Regini attempts.more pragmatically,to
"understand how unions are induced or not to accept (or to 
promote) a relation of stable political exchange and concertation, 
perceiving such a choice as the result of an .approximate, 
'rational' calculus of costs which the exchange can involve 
and of the benefits it can produce." (1983:362).
Regini is aware that such an approach poses "the vexata 
quaestio;of the limitations of the models of rational action" 
(1983:362).making explicit,however,that
"in this case it is not a matter of establishing to what degree 
the unions are effectively rational actors, it is instead a 
matter of inquiring to what degree,assuming that their action 
can be analyzed as if it follows a logic of utilitarian ratio­
nality, one will be able to develop an internally more consistent 




























































































vaste empirical evidence,than other kinds of explanation 
ppt forward." <1983:362) (20).
It is thus as an heuristic device and as an operational 
concept capable of explaining the "rise and decline of 
concertation in Italy and Great Britain" (1983:353) that
(21)Regini proposes his model of unions'."rational" calculation .
6 . CONDITIONS FOR STABILITY OF POLITICAL EXCHANGE
Every negotiation between large organizations,wheter it 
involves parties on the labor market (collective bargaining), 
or business associations ( "Quasi Politik"),or the state with 
one or more interest organizations (political exchange),is 
composed of a mix of conflict and co-operation.
The co-operation is induced by the systemic interdipendecies 
that push forward an agreement ; conflict is established with 
regard to the exchange terms between resources,when not even 
with regard to the rules of the game. This dual character of 
every exchange relation is the basis of its potential instability, 
and leads to the question : "under wha<t> conditions strategies 
of political exchange do consolidate ? ">'( Regini , 1983: 366) .
Even more,it leads to the theme of neo-corporatism ,where the 
kind of political exchange- I have defined as "stable" (see 
sect, three) occurs.
But to talk of the stability of a relation of political 
exchange over time ,of its perpetuation or renewal»means to 
speak Of the stability of the strategic choices of the state, 
on the one hand.ond of interest organizations»on the other.
To be more concrete,the question of the state's "dredibility" 
is central,either during the negotiation between public and 
private actors,or after the reached agreement,in its imple­
mentation. Assuming that the state has always an-interest in 
concluding political exchanges (without considering that "for • < 




























































































crisis are for the state no more "interesting" - Carrieri 
and Donolo,1983),one can say that such political exchanges 
are more probable and more recurrent the larger the state's 
"credibility". What I understand as "credibility" is the 
perception, by social parties,that the state is capable of 
making profitable proposals to them,and further of realizing • 
them at the decisional and at the executive level. This 
perception is great • when the government has a solid and 
large parliamentary majority,the public administration is 
efficaciuous and effective,the state in the past has fullfilled 
its promises.
As regards interest organizations ,the central problem 
is that of the temporal lag,that is,their capacity to make 
members renounce something today,in exchange for something 
tomorrow,where this something is,in political exchange,offered 
by the state.
Pizzorno makes the question explicit reinterpreting the
(22)workers' dilemma of Lancaster . Shifting the problem
from the field of collective bargaining to political exchange, 
he reformulated the dilemma substituting for "the investment 
function of capitalist" the "mediation function of union 
leaders" (1978:288). The dilemma thus reformulated refers to 
delivering or not part of the present total power of the 
workers to their representatives,and substitutes "capital 
accumulation" for "power accumulation" (it is clear by the 
context that Pizzorno means "power resources accumulation") 
(1978:288).
In fact»whenever^unions' leadership is capable ,by control­
ling rank-and-file behavior and claims,of limiting the threat 
to social order (constituted by the above-cited "external 
economies" of collective bargaining),it offers consensus to 
the state. For this immediate unions' renounciation there are 
payoffs offered by the state which are,necessarily,delayed in 




























































































nization will solve,at least momentarily,the problem of the 
temporal lag ; that is,they have given "an inter-temporal 
dimension to the formation of labour's claims" (Pizzorno, 
1978:287).
But to guarantee the presence of stable political exchanges 
it is necessary that this situation perpetuates itself and 
renews itself. In other words it is necessary that the basis, 
either of a workers' or of a business organization,continues 
to accept and renegotiate the "under-exploitation" of its 
short-term power resources in exchange for long-term benefits.
I concentrate now on the answers given by the Italian 
literature to the problem of the stabilization of exchange, 
first at the theoretical level (Mutti),and then with concrete 
reference to state-unions relations (Regini).
Mutti (1985)frames the problem starting from the connection 
between political exchange and uncertainty.
"How are agreements and repeated exchanges possible in situation 
of uncertainty about the stakes,the terms of exchange and the 
rules of the game ? " (1985:55).
According to him.it is to this fundamental question that
the neo-corporatist literature has sought answers in various
ways. This question has been answered by taking into
consideration different stabilizing mechanisms of the exchange
relations: the autonomy level of the organizational leadership,
the kinds of stakes of the exchange,the nature of the procedural(23)rules of the negotiation,the possible role of the state
Regini (1983:367).referring explicitly to neo-corporatist
state-unions relations,criticizes th. literature for having
(24)linked the presence of some structural conditions to the
presence of stabilized political exchange in a too mechanistic
way. In this manner,one would not be capable of adequately
(25)accounting for some important concrete situations
The stabilization of political exchange is for Regini 
understandable only by considering also the "calculations 




























































































He does not deny the importance of the structural context,but 
he emphasizes .breaking a rigid structure-action link,the 
capacity of the actors to create "functional equivalents" 
(1983:371) to missing requisites.
The degree of stability of concertation,as defined by Regini 
(see sect, three), dependson the following factors.
a) The profitability for the unions of the results of "a
systematic and long-term political exchange" (1983:362).The
perception of the advantages of such an exchange derives from
an approximate cost - benefit " 'rational' calculation" (1983:
362).One has in fact to stress that also with "favorable"
structural conditions such as the presence of a pro-labor
(25)government ,the "political valence" of neo-corporatist
political exchange can be or become unsatisfactory for the 
unions. Situations of economic or fiscal crisis,social conflict, 
foreign trade or monetary crisis can constrain also a pro-labor 
government to decrease benefits delivered to the unions.At 
this point,the unions' own "rational calculation" could lead 
them to the choice of exit from the exchange.
b) The presence of instruments (both organizational capac­
ities and availability of resources of various kind) that allow 
the perpetuation in time of a strategy of concertation without 
excessive instability. Regini identifies these instruments with 
the capacity of the unions to control a potential crisis of 
representation,that is to say. a revolt of rank-and-file,and 
with the capacity to build,and/or to defend,an unions' 
"oligopolistic position in the political bargaining with the 
governments" (1983:370). Both these capacities are not 
reducehble only to the structural context,but involve the 
unions' ability ,at the moment of making their strategic choices, 






























































































Note_l: Very significant is the recent Lehmbruch's position,
according to which the neo—corporatist strategy would thus be 
determined by an exchange logic" (1983:13).' Elsewhere (1 9 8 4:1 4 ) 
he refers to Regini and Lange,pointing out the importance
of the rational actor perspective in the. understanding of neo- 
corporatist agreements. See also the use of Rizzorno's concept 
of political exchange in Lange (1981: 202 ),and especially in
Tarrow (1978:21 ; 1979:267-70) who speaks of vertical political
exchange between center and periphery. Schmitter,very explicitly, 
states :"To use an Italian expression,neo-corporatism depends on 
a scambio politico*,a political exchange in which organized in­
terests and state agencies calculatedly,if not always willingly 
and enthuiàstically,agree to a particular pattern of formal 
representation and substantive negotiation." (1985:6).
Other authors are developing other concepts building on poli­
tical exchange notions. Marin and Wagner criticize in a 
constructive way Pizzorno's original concept of political 
exchange and integrate it with conceptual tools deriving from 
different theoretical traditions. They propose the concept of 
"generalized political exchange",which is considerably different 
from the Italian "political exchange" presented in this paper and 
is directed to explain a wider class of phenomena.See Marin and 
Wagner 1985,Marin 1985a and 1985b.
Note 2: Blau defines power as "the ability of persons or groups
to impose their will on others despite resistance through de4- 
terrence either in the forms of withholding regularly supplied 
rewards or in the form of punishment...“(1964:117).
Note 3 : According to Weber, "power (Macht) is the probability
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a posi­
tion to carry out his own despite resistance,regardless of the 
basis on which this probability rests." (1957:152).
Note 4 : Dahl defines power as the "capacity of person A to
make person B do something that he would not have done without 
A's intervention." (1957:201).
Note 5: Where "pertinent" means the capacity of A to use in
the best way those resources at his disposal which interest 
most B,rather than others which interest B less.
Note 6: "The state" (lo Stato),in Italy.usually means the
government and the public administration,excluding political 
parties. The notion of "regime",highly diffused in the Anglo- 
American literature,is almost totally neglected by Italians, 
which are more closer to the French étatique and to the German 
staatliche traditions.Also,the use of the term "state" is often 
preferred to the use of the term "government','.which is more 
restricted in its meaning.
Note 7 : Elsewhere , I have distinguished..betwéeh-.Agu
resources of social power of labor and capital,referring to 
Korpi (1978) and Offe and Wiesenthal'(1980):
" The main power'resource at the disposal of labor is the orga­
nization of the employees.with the connected possibility of 




























































































state (party) arena. Consequently,the creation of a collective 
identity by means of organization,ideology and participation is 
crucial ih the formation of power resources and the logic of 
collective action of the employees. The capitalists base their 
power resources mainly on the possession of the means of pro­
duction. Therefore,these resources are pre-existent to a possible 
collective action. This fact does not prevent capitalist from 
possessing three different forms of collective action:the firm,
informal cooperation and the association." (Parri: 1984:100-1).
Note’ 8 : In fact,writes Pizzorno : "In addition to the direct
result of bargaining (wage increases,new work rules),such action 
may have secondary effects analogous to the external economies 
of decisions taken on the market in ordinary goods 1 : a demonstra­
tion which brings urban traffic to a halt, a strike-which harms 
the users of public services,a union strategy which has impact 
on election results. In the conditions of modern industrial 
society such secondary effects are becoming increasingly 
frequent." (1978:286).
Note 9: The discussion is still open whether these direct
relations marginalize or integrate the intermediation channel 
centered on political parties.The importance of the parlia­
mentary consensus for expenditures and obligations which neo- 
corporatist political exchanges require has been pointed out 
by Lehmbruch (1384:25-30).
Note IQ?. The term "political sociology",referring to research 
in this "grey zone",is becoming very common in Italy. In a 
lucid article of 1968 Sartori distinguishes between "sociology 
of politics",as a sociological reduction of politics,and "the 
true'‘political sociology'* as an interdisciplinary hybrid which 
utilizes contextually sociological explicative variables as 
well as politological explicative variables." (1968:603). 
"Political sociology" is then an "interdisciplinary discipline" 
which shows "to what extent the political community reflects 
the society and to what extent the society reflects the imprint 
of the political community."v (1968 : 637).
Note 11: Regini defines "concertation"as"a"way of formulating
political choices characterized by the participation of large 
interest organizations to the decisional process in a context 
of systematic,regular,long-term exchange between these orga­
nizations and the governments." (1983:359). Thus,he practically 
assimilates concertation and neo-corporatism at the decisional i 
level.
Note 12: Regini never explicity talks about "pluralist political
exchange". More than once.however •,he seems to distinguish 
between exchange relations based on "bargaining" or on "con-n'i-- 
certation" (or"co-operation‘! ), in order to introduce the 
distinction between pluralist and neo-corporatist political 
exchange (Regini,1981 : 27-8 ; Regalia and Regini,1982 : 320).
Note 13: "Quasi-Politik",or "quasi-political self-administra­
tion of capital" (Ronge,1980:14) means,in the German and Swiss 
debate (Hotz,1979),the presence of agreeements.both decisional 




























































































which permit the private realization of veritable monetary, 
conjunctural,professional training,welfare,external trade 
policies. The state is kept excluded from these agreeements, 
confining itself to the ex post legal sanctionning of them in 
the case of "free riding" problems.
Note 14: This does not mean,as the "Oxford School" has in
fact pointed out (Clegg,Flanders and Fox,1980),that collective 
bargaining does not have an important "political" significance 
for the reproduction of the society. Where "political" means 
general regulative,or better,self-regulative action.
Note 15: For a critical overview of classical theories of
"rational" action see Huard (1980:540-51),March (1982) and 
Grandori (1984).
Mote 16: Elster defines "parametric rationality" as that of
an actor who "treats his environment as a constant" and who 
"believe(s) that he is the only one whose behaviour is variable, 
and that all the others are parameters for his decision 
problem." (1979:18).
Note 17: For Elster "the strategically rational actor takes
account of the fact that the environment is made up of other 
actors,and that he is part of their environment,and that they 
know this etc." (1979:18). He,therefore,attempts,at the moment 
of action,to take into consideration the intentions as well ' 
as the reactions of other actors.
Note 18: Referring to the "garbage can decision process",March
and Olsen state : "Suppose we view a choice opportunity as a 
garbage can into which various problems and solutions are dumpted 
by participants. The mix of garbage in a single can depends 
partly on the labels attached to the alternative cans; but it 
also depends partly on what garbage is being produced at the 
moment,on the mix of cans available,and on the speed with which 
garbage is collected and removed from the scene,...,the nature 
of the choice,the time it takes,and the problems it solves all 
depend on a relatively complicated intermeshing of the mix of 
choices available at any one time,the mix of problems that have 
access to the organization,the mix of solutions looking for 
problems,and the outside demands on the decision maker©-" (1976: 
26 and 36)
Note 19: Rusconi provides the example of a political exchange
leading to an anti-inflation pact: "The state does not limit 
itself to binding contracting parties which realizes bilateral 
agreements and to bearing the costs. The state,however,does 
its part (cuts in public spending,tax reliefs,credit policies), 
the effects of which go well beyond the interest horizon of the 
direct bargaining social parties.These arrive at the coordination 
of their behaviors,not only because they count on the binding 
force of the state,but also because they are compensated by the 
state distributive actions." (1984:74). Further on,Rusconi 
formalizes this situation in the " 'game of political exchange1 " 
(1984:222).
Note 20: Among the other models of unions' action, I should
mention the "sociological theory of opportunism" by Offe and 
Wiesenthal (1980:103-9) and the "theory of class conflict between 




























































































Note 21: Regini writes : "To summarize the principal elements
of the proposed analytical scheme,one can say that,as far as 
the logic of unions' action is concerned,the emergence of a 
sytematic political exchange which permits concertation will 
be possible in the presence of three conditions:
i) The possibility,through political exchange,of modifying 
the result of the working of the market in a more fruitful or 
less risky manner than by the classic means of collective 
bargaining. This possibility is a function of at least one of 
the following elements : greater unions' strength in the 
political market than in the industrial relation sphere ; ^ 
greater importance of the state compared to firms as provider 
of resources ; an economic situation which makes the full 
exploitation of bargaining power very risky for the unions.
ii) A high organizational capacity to under-exploit unions' 
own bargaining power in view of future benefits,thus to prefer 
long-term goals over immediate ones. This capacity depends 
mainly on the availability of instruments to control the unions' 
crisis of representation,which constitutes a potential threat 
to such a choice.
iii) A high organizational capacity to aggregate,or better 
to 'pre-mediate' a plurality of fragmented interests and to 
become their represenative in the political market,so that 
unions can assume an 'oligopolistic position' in the negotiation 
with governments.This capacity is a function of the unions' 
organizational concentration,on the one hand,and of the power 
of delegation tacitly granted to them by diverse social groups 
in order to act in their name in the relation with governments, 
on the other hand." (1983:365).
Note 22: The workers' dilemma of Lancaster is as
follows: "Should (the workers) forgo present consumption by 
handing over part of total income to the capitalists ? If they 
do not,they will obtain no higher consumption in the future;If 
they do,they have no guarantee that the capitalists will 
actually invest sufficient of this income to bring about the 
desired level of increase." (1973:1095).
Note 23: Mutti examines these mechanisms one by one:
"The strengthening of the autonomy of the system of represen­
tation vis-a-vis the represented is a typical solution to 
reduce uncertainty." (1985:64). Moreover,the stakes can be better 
specified or standardized in order to become less ambiguous and 
further they can be reduced in time duration.The structure of 
reciprocity of the exchange can become less exposed to the 
economic and political "cycle",establishing minimal standard 
principles of distributive justice. The procedural rules of the 
exchange can be better specified in order to avoid conflicts 
and uncertainties of behavior . And,obviously,the state has a 
broad range of possibilities at its disposal to reduce the 
uncertainty of the negotiation and of the respect for the terms 




























































































Note 24: "Among these conditions,some in particular are
usually listed as indispensable : high centralization and 
concentration of the interest organizations,their representational 
monopoly,the presence of a pro-labor party in office." (Regini, 
1983:367).
Note 25: In particular Regini(1983 : 373-81) demonstrates how,
in the case of the "solidarietà nazionale" in Italy (1977- 
1979) and in that of the "social contract" in Great Britain 
(1974-1979),it has been possible to reach agreements,even 
though fragile,of neo-corporatist type,also in the absence of 
a large part of the structural pre-requisites indicated by the 
literature.
Note 26: Regini defines the "political valence" of the
content of a neo-corporatist political exchange on the basis 
of "its different degrees of responsiveness to the goals of the 
workers' movement." (1983:357). He indicates then how the 
relative strength of the unions "can probably explain the 
different contents and results of concertation." (1983:366).
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